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Abstract Is physicalism compatible with either panpsychism or so-called ‘‘fun-
damental mentality’’? Minimal physicalism, I contend, is compatible with both. We
should therefore jettison the ‘‘No Fundamental Mentality’’ constraint, a proposed
constraint on the definition of ‘‘the physical’’, not to mention the false limits it
places on physicalist theories of mind.
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1 When the chips are down…
Is physicalism compatible with either panpsychism or so-called ‘‘fundamental
mentality’’? If it is compatible with both, our definition of ‘‘the physical’’ is not
subject to the ‘‘No Fundamental Mentality (or NFM)’’1 constraint: roughly, that, on
pain of not being physical, fundamental physical entities (e.g., electrons) cannot
instantiate mental properties. The physicalist would thus be free to posit
fundamental mentality.
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1 I borrow the phrases ‘‘No Fundamental Mentality constraint’’ and ‘‘NFM constraint’’ from Jessica
Wilson (2006).
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This theoretical freedom may be exactly what the physicalist needs. The NFM
constraint clearly takes cards from the physicalist’s hand, cards worth playing when
the chips are down. Specifically, a theorist facing the unpleasant choice between
eliminative materialism and an explanatory gap might reconsider the virtues of
fundamental mentality.2
Fortunately, physicalism is compatible with both. My position rests on three key
ideas:
(i) That, of two senses of ‘fundamental mentality’, only one is incompatible with
physicalism, which, as it turns out, is not the sense relevant to the NFM
constraint.
(ii) That physicalism does not entail (and should not be confused with) what I call
‘configurationism’, the view that only highly-configured entities can have
mental properties.
(iii) That physicalism does not even entail (and should not be confused with) what I
call ‘weak configurationism’, the view that only configured entities (whether or
not they are highly-configured) can have mental properties.
Together, I contend, these ideas suggest that physicalism is compatible with
fundamental mentality, as well as panpsychism. We should therefore jettison the
NFM constraint and the false limits it places on physicalist theories of mind.
2 Minimal physicalism (a caveat)
Throughout the following discussion the specific view of interest is minimal
physicalism,3 i.e., the minimal thesis one can endorse while remaining a physicalist.
One may contrast minimal physicalism with mainstream physicalism, i.e., the
majority view of those who currently consider themselves physicalists.
Though mainstream physicalism is no doubt important, its various forms may
depart from minimal physicalism. Physicalism, for example, historically proves to
be a fairly dynamic thesis,4 at least in the details. Consider the fact that most (if not
all) physicalists once equated being physical with being mechanistic. Surely, despite
its historic universality, we no longer think this is an essential part of physicalism,
particularly given the advent and widespread acceptance of quantum mechanics.
Minimal rather than mainstream physicalism is the view of interest, because the
NFM constraint (constraining the very definition of the physical) has perfectly
general implications as to what counts as physicalism. If any legitimate version of
physicalism is compatible with panpsychism and fundamental mentality, then the
NFM constraint wrongly defines it out of existence. If no legitimate version of
physicalism is compatible with either, then the NFM constraint is at least
permissible if not rightly imposed. The perfect generality of minimal physicalism
(i.e., its feature of capturing what is essential to all versions of physicalism)
therefore makes it the relevant view throughout the following.
2 Compare Galen Strawson (2006).
3 ‘Minimal physicalism’ is a term that goes back at least to David Lewis (1983).
4 See, e.g., Bas van Fraassen (2002, pp. 49–61).
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3 Getting started: Lewis’s ‘‘panpsychistic materialism’’ and the NFM
constraint
The most developed part of the debate over the NFM constraint concerns whether
physicalism is compatible with panpsychism. Following the literature, I focus (at
least to start with) on the distinct issue of whether physicalism is compatible with
panpsychism. I later turn to whether physicalism is compatible with fundamental
mentality.
Lewis (1983) briefly argues that physicalism and panpsychism are metaphysi-
cally compossible theses, or that what he labels ‘‘Panpsychistic Materialism’’ is
metaphysically possible. In support of this he writes the following:
It is often noted that psychophysical identity is a two-way street: if all mental
properties are physical, then some physical properties are mental. But perhaps
not just some but all physical properties might be mental as well; and indeed
every property of anything might be at once physical and mental. (Lewis 362–
363)
Stoljar (2001a) reasons to the same conclusion and even, in doing so, cites the
above passage:
[…] no matter how implausible and outlandish it sounds, panpsychism per se
is not inconsistent with physicalism [cites Lewis here]. After all, the fact that
there are some conscious beings is not contrary to physicalism—why then
should the possibility that everything is a conscious being be contrary to
physicalism? (Stoljar, §10)5
Such compatibility is clearly in tension with the NFM constraint. According to it:
The NFM Constraint No fundamental physical entity (or property)—and no
relatively fundamental physical entity (or property)—can be mental.6
This entails that physicalism cannot be true in a panpsychistic world since such a
world contains fundamental mentality (as well as relatively fundamental mentality).7
This leads pro-NFMers, notably Wilson (2006), to deny Lewis and Stoljar’s claim.
I now turn to Wilson’s argument and a development of it that I call the ‘parts
argument’.
4 Wilson’s argument and the parts argument for physicalism’s
incompatibility with panpsychism
Wilson’s argument comes in response to Stoljar. According to her, Stoljar offers the
following argument:
5 See Stoljar 2001b, 2001c, where he presents the object-based definition of ‘‘the physical’’. Here he
further illuminates what he says in this passage.
6 Compare Wilson’s formulation (Wilson 2006, p. 72). She requires that fundamental physical entities
(perhaps including properties) neither possess nor bestow mentality (Wilson 72).
7 Or so one might think. I soon question whether all panpsychistic worlds include fundamental mentality.
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1. That there are some conscious beings is compatible with physicalism.
2. Given (1), there is no principled reason not to allow that the possibility that all
beings are conscious is compatible with physicalism.
Therefore, panpsychism is compatible with physicalism. (Wilson 78)
She denies premise two with the following counterargument:
[…] (most) physicalists believe ‘‘that there are some conscious beings is
compatible with physicalism’’; but this is because they think that conscious-
ness (like mentality generally) is nothing over and above configurational
physical goings on […], not because they think that any [emphasis mine]
physical entities are themselves conscious […]. Hence […] [physicalism is]
compatible with there being some (non-fundamental) conscious beings yet
incompatible with all beings—including relatively fundamental beings—being
conscious. (Wilson 79)
Wilson (2005) here (in sentence one) commits all physicalists to what I call ‘‘the
Configuration Principle’’8:
The configuration principle Only highly-configured physical entities are con-
scious (or mental in any way9).10
Accordingly, she reasons (in sentence two) that not all entities can be conscious,
because ‘‘relatively fundamental entities’’ are among those entities. (Presumably,
she also assumes that absolutely fundamental entities are among the totality of
entities as well.11) Hence, the argument relies upon the basic assumption, one that
many will find quite natural, that the totality of entities includes non-highly-
configured entities of various sorts (both fundamental and relatively fundamental).
Here, a slight complication arises. Is this second assumption about the totality of
entities in the actual world or in every (non-empty) possible world12? If the
assumption is the former, then Wilson’s premises are as follows:
(1) Physicalism includes or entails the Configuration Principle (the principle that
only highly-configured physical entities are conscious).
8 Wilson might mean to exclude physicalists who are eliminativists about the mental. She presumably
has such theorists in mind when including the parenthetical hedge ‘most’ at the beginning of sentence
one. Though interesting arguments might exist for the view that minimal physicalism is incompatible
with mentality, I here put this view to the side. For, it is surely an extremely controversial view (if not flat-
out wrong) and beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes I therefore assume that minimal
physicalism is compatible with mentality and take Wilson to commit all physicalists to the Configuration
Principle.
9 In what follows I drop this parenthetical addition, though I assume it to be there implicitly.
10 Wilson links ‘‘configurational physical goings on’’ with what she calls ‘‘relatively non-fundamental’’
physical beings. This suggests that the ‘highly’ in ‘highly-configured’ is appropriate since ‘‘relatively
fundamental’’ physical beings might be configured as well, though perhaps to a lesser degree.
11 In fact, she may be assuming that truly fundamental beings are a species of relatively fundamental
beings.
12 The relevant domain, if desired, may be restricted to every (non-empty) physicalist possible world.
This may be done throughout the discussion.
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(2) The totality of entities in the actual world includes non-highly-configured
entities.
If the assumption is the latter, the second premise is instead 20:
(20) The totality of entities in every (non-empty) possible world includes non-
highly-configured entities.
Unfortunately, the passage does not make it clear which second premise Wilson
has in mind. However, the issue does.13 The NFM constraint constrains the very
definition of ‘‘the physical’’, thus giving it perfectly general modal implications
about how to understand physicalism. So, the relevant question is whether
physicalism and panpsychism can both be true in any (non-empty) possible world.
(1) and (2) are clearly not up to the task of showing that they cannot be.
Wilson’s argument therefore must consist of (1) and (20):
(1) Physicalism includes or entails the Configuration Principle.
(20) The totality of entities in any (non-empty) possible world includes non-
highly-configured entities.14
(3) Therefore, physicalism and panpsychism cannot both be true in any (non-
empty) possible world.
But, why should Wilson (or anyone) think (20) is true?
A reasonable assumption to make here is that anyone who accepts (20) also
accepts what I call the ‘Parts Principle’:
The parts principle Every possible highly-configured entity has an entity that is
not highly-configured as a proper part.15
To see why, suppose, for reductio, that (20) is true and that the Parts Principle is
false. Then, some possible highly-configured entity (H) has no non-highly-
configured entities as proper parts. A possible world consisting only of H and H’s
proper parts would then be a (non-empty) possible world in which no non-highly-
configured entity exists. Hence (20) is contradicted, showing that (20) entails the
Parts Principle.16,17
13 Wilson, after all, claims to show that physicalists and non-physicalists alike have good reason to
impose the NFM constraint (Wilson 70).
14 See footnote 12.
15 The relevant domain here also could be restricted to physicalist possible worlds.
16 In fact, the Parts Principle entails 20) as well. For, suppose the Parts Principle is true. It is a logical
truth that every (non-empty) possible world contains an entity that is highly-configured or one that is not
highly-configured. By the Parts Principle, the former worlds contain a non-highly configured entity. Any
of the latter worlds, ex hypothesi, contain a being that is not highly-configured. So, if the Parts Principle is
true, so is 20).
17 I thank the reviewer for bringing the following rebuttal to my attention. It goes something like this:
Assume, for the sake of argument, 20). Then, consistent with this, there’s a possible world w with at least
two entities (say) a and b: a is not highly-configured, whereas b is and has only highly-configured parts.
The possibility of a world like w (i.e. one that contains something like b) contradicts the Parts Principle.
So, 20) can be true even if PP is not. That is, the Parts Principle may entail 20) but not vice versa.
I guess I am assuming that if an object can exist in a world, then an intrinsic duplicate of it exists in a
world containing only it and its parts. If that is right, then if a world like w exists, a world w* also exists
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Besides providing a reason for (20), the Parts Principle also provides a new and
crafty argument for (3), that is, once combined with (1). Specifically, any physicalist
world containing one conscious and hence highly-configured entity now contains
an entity that is not highly-configured and hence not conscious. This leads to the
surprising result that the mere existence of one conscious entity in a physicalist world
would entail the existence of an unconscious one, thus falsifying panpsychism.
The following argument, what I call the ‘parts argument’, is therefore a valid
argument:
(1) Physicalism includes or entails the Configuration Principle.
(200) The Parts Principle is true.
(3) Therefore, physicalism and panpsychism cannot both be true in any (non-
empty) possible world.
Wilson, in the passage, is clearly very far from formulating or explicitly
endorsing the Parts Principle or suggesting it is the second premise in her argument.
Still, I prefer this argument to (what is more clearly) her argument because of the
just-observed theoretical potence of the Parts Principle. Besides, problems for the
Parts Principle are problems for (20), given the (two-way) entailment between them.
It is this argument that I now analyze and consequently reject.
5 Against the parts argument
5.1 Does physicalism entail ‘‘Configurationism’’?
Must all physicalists be committed to the Configuration Principle? Or, equivalently:
Does physicalism entail what I call ‘configurationism’? It is difficult to say,
especially given the real threat of begging the question. For, whether one accepts the
NFM constraint likely decides how one answers this. But, the answer here is
ultimately supposed to tell us (by figuring into the parts argument) whether to accept
the NFM constraint.
To find neutral ground it might be tempting to shift the concern to mainstream
physicalism (i.e., the majority view of those who currently consider themselves
physicalists). That way one can get an independent handle on what (self-
proclaimed) physicalists currently believe. Then, one could turn to the question
of whether that view (whatever it is) includes or entails configurationism.
This, unfortunately, is not an option. For, again, minimal—not mainstream-
physicalism is the view at issue. Accordingly, Lewis also explicitly concerns
himself with minimal physicalism when discussing Panpsychistic Materialism, and
so too with Stoljar, who is following Lewis.
As for minimal physicalism, it certainly does not seem to entail configurationism.
Jaegwon Kim, for example, attributes three theses to minimal physicalism, none of
Footnote 17 continued
which contains only b (which is highly-configured) and its (every single one of them, highly-configured)
parts. This is not consistent with 20). So, though the existence of a world like w may at first seem
consistent with 20), it ultimately is not all things considered.
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which is the Configuration Principle. They are: mind–body supervenience, mind–
body dependence, and an anti-Cartesian principle.18 Lewis, in contrast, only
requires a supervenience thesis, as does (e.g.,) Chalmers.19 Prominent accounts of
minimal physicalism, then, do not include the principle. Nor is it obvious that any of
these theses, either separately or combined, entail it. It therefore is at best
questionable that physicalism entails configurationism. So much for premise one.
5.2 High configuration and worlds without simples
The second premise of the parts argument (the Parts Principle) is equally
problematic if not more so. If being ‘‘highly-configured’’ is simply a matter of
having a large number of parts, everything in an infinitely decomposable world is
highly-configured, including every proper part of anything. Hence, if infinitely
decomposable worlds are possible, the Parts Principle is not a necessary truth.20
The Parts Principle, then, is (most likely) contingent. This means physicalism is
logically compatible with panpsychism even if minimal physicalism were to entail the
Configuration Principle. For, physicalist worlds exist in which the Configuration
Principle holds (worlds where everything that is conscious is highly-configured) but in
which everything is (infinitely) highly-configured, thus allowing everything to be
conscious.
To control for this, one could revise the Parts Principle to make it something both
similar to the original and plausibly non-contingent. Ultimately, however, this fares
just as poorly.
For example, one promising revision of the principle is:
The revised parts principle Every possible highly-configured entity has an n-
level proper part (for some sufficiently high value of n).
X is a ‘‘1-level’’ proper part of Y if X is a proper part of Y; ‘‘2-level’’ if X is a
proper part of a proper part of Y; and so forth.21 The principle basically says, then,
that every highly-configured physical entity has at least one more basic part, where
the degree to which it is more basic is specified by n. If n, for example, is high, then
every highly-configured physical entity has a very much more basic part.22
18 See Kim 1996, pp. 9–13.
19 See Lewis 1983, pp. 361–64 and Chalmers 1996, pp. 41–42.
20 Denying the possibility of such worlds is, of course, one option in logical space, though not a very
plausible one. A different option is to deny either that physicalism can be true in an infinitely
decomposable world or that the physical can exist in such a world, in which case the Parts Principle
would not need to be a necessary truth. This, first of all, would be an addition to the present argument.
But, second, room for deep skepticism about either denial certainly exists as well.
21 Of course, every n-level part is also an n - 1 level part, but that doesn’t affect the argument.
22 An alternative way of fleshing out ‘relatively fundamental’ is implicit here. Something can of course be
relatively fundamental in that a relatively small number of simple parts compose it. But, as suggested here,
something can be relatively fundamental (merely) in that it is a certain kind of building block (i.e., an
n-level proper part) of something else. These two senses of the term ‘relatively fundamental’ are not
necessarily co-extensive (though their extension, in some possible worlds, can partially or wholly overlap).
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This, however, introduces a new problem. For, though the Revised Parts
Principle is not contingent (even holding in infinitely decomposable worlds), it does
not combine with the Configuration Principle to rule out panpsychism in physicalist
worlds. That is, for all the Revised Parts Principle says, some infinitely
decomposable world exists in which every proper part of a highly-configured
physical entity is itself a highly-configured physical entity, hence one that could be
conscious consistent with the Configuration Principle.
One might introduce a third principle:
The N-level principle Any n-level part of a highly-configured entity is not
conscious.
This, however, is highly implausible. For example, humans themselves could be
n-level parts of some unconscious but highly-configured entity, in which case the
principle denies consciousness to humans.
A better principle might be:
The revised N-level principle Any n-level part of a conscious highly-configured
entity is not conscious.
But it is logically possible that conscious entities, in some world, form a proper
part of larger entities that are themselves conscious. In fact, even in the regular
world, split-brain experiments suggest that the larger consciousness of the self is
composed of two conscious parts, each corresponding to one of the hemispheres.
Whether or not that is the case, such a scenario is certainly possible. It is not clear
why something similar could not be possible for such ‘‘n-level entities’’ (i.e., entities
that are n-level parts of other conscious ones).
In conclusion, no obvious replacement for the Parts Principle is both plausibly
non-contingent and completes the argument. One must continue adding to the
argument more (probably contingent23) principles in order to make it work or
perhaps try building more than configurationism into minimal physicalism (which is
questionable at configurationism). The parts argument, then, is in serious trouble if
not outright hopeless.
6 Refining the debate
It would be good if the pro-NFMer could avoid the prior issue altogether, i.e., the
issue of whether physicalism is compossible with panpsychism. For, as far as the
prior discussion goes, it seems that physicalism is in fact compatible with
panpsychism, at least in infinitely decomposable worlds.
As luck would have it, a natural reading of the constraint exists that suggests this
issue is in fact avoidable. To see this, recall what the NFM constraint says:
The NFM constraint No fundamental physical entity (or property)—and no
relatively fundamental physical entity (or property)—can be mental.
23 I.e., contingent even within the restricted domain of physicalist worlds.
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A pro-NFMer could plausibly take ‘relatively fundamental physical entity’ to
mean the following:
(i) a physical entity that is decomposable into no more than m simple parts24
On this interpretation, infinitely decomposable worlds are beside the point. For,
infinitely decomposable worlds contain no simples of any sort and hence contain no
fundamental physical entities or even (in the above sense) relatively fundamental
physical entities. The constraint, as such, is not designed to rule out panpsychism in
infinitely decomposable physicalist worlds.
Thankfully, one topic is undeniably relevant to the NFM constraint, no matter
how one interprets the term ‘relatively fundamental physical entity’. For, the
constraint is a claim about fundamental physical entities, no matter what else it is a
claim about. One question, then, is clearly relevant: Is physicalism compatible with
fundamental mentality? If it is, this is fatal for the NFM constraint.25
7 The argument from anti-dualism for physicalism’s incompatibility
with fundamental mentality
To begin addressing this question, consider one simple argument for the negative
answer (Wilson 2006):
Given that physicalism is an anti-dualist doctrine, […] [the boundaries of the
physical] may not stretch so far as to encompass fundamental mentality.26 Hence
physicalists (and their rivals) have good reason to impose the NFM (no
fundamental mentality) constraint on their operative account of the physical.
(Wilson 70)
The argument’s two premises are:
(1) Physicalism is an anti-dualist doctrine.
(2) Anti-dualist doctrines are incompatible with fundamental mentality.
(1) and (2) definitely entail that:
Physicalism is incompatible with fundamental mentality.
But, Wilson suggests they entail:
(3) ‘‘[…] [That] physicalists (and their rivals) have good reason to imposethe NFM
[i.e., the no fundamental mentality] constraint on their operative account of the
physical (Wilson 70).’’
24 See footnote sixteen for a possible alternative.
25 Though panpsychism could be worked back into the discussion, it is completely inessential to do so. The
core issue is whether fundamental physical entities can be mental. If they cannot be mental, then of course it
is true that, a fortiori, panpsychism is false in a world with such entities. But, that is more of an afterthought.
26 The full sentence reads: Given that physicalism is an anti-dualist doctrine, then while (in response to
the first horn of Hempel’s dilemma) the physics-based boundaries of the physical may stretch, they cannot
stretch so far as to encompass fundamental mentality (Wilson 70).
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Call this argument—the argument from (1) and (2) to (3)—the ‘‘argument from
anti-dualism’’.
8 Against the argument from anti-dualism
8.1 Two senses of ‘fundamental mentality’
It is uncontroversial that physicalists must avoid fundamental mentality in one
special sense. All should agree the most basic thesis of physicalism is everything
(including the mental) is physical. And, all should agree this thesis, in turn, is
incompatible with the following:
(i) that mental things exist that are not physical
and
(ii) that mental properties exist that are not even ‘‘dependent’’27 physical
properties.
A view that rejects either (i) or (ii) embraces mentality as ontologically
fundamental, which is one sense of ‘fundamental mentality’:
Fundamental mentality (1) 5 Mentality that is fundamental either mental
substances/objects are ontologically fundamental (meaning they are not themselves
identical to, metaphysically supervenient on, reducible to, etc., physical substances/
objects); or mental properties are ontologically fundamental (meaning they are not
themselves physical properties or identical to, metaphysically supervenient on, etc.,
physical properties).
However, a different sense of ‘fundamental mentality’ is involved in the NFM
constraint. The constraint says that, on pain of not being physical, a fundamental
physical entity cannot be mental. If such an entity could be mental, this would be
(an instance of) what the pro-NFMer calls ‘‘fundamental mentality’’, providing a
second sense of the term:
Fundamental mentality (2) 5 Mentality that is instantiated by a fundamental
physical entity i.e., something is a fundamental physical entity and it instantiates
at least one mental property,28,29
27 By ‘dependent physical property’ I mean a property that somehow metaphysically depends on normal
physical properties (e.g., property P1 metaphysically supervenes on a normal physical property P; a
normal physical property, P, realizes P1).
28 Note that, strictly speaking, this second sense is incoherent according to the NFM constraint. If a
mental property applies to something fundamental, it cannot be physical. So, on this view, it is logically
impossible for mentality to apply to a fundamental physical thing.
29 Referring to this as ‘‘fundamental mentality’’ is potentially misleading. Whereas the adjective
‘fundamental’ appears to apply to the noun ‘mentality’, it really applies to the physical entity that
instantiates the mental property. Formalizing things helps bear this out. Let ‘Px’, ‘Fx’, ‘Mx’, and ‘Iyx’
respectively stand for ‘x is physical’, ‘x is fundamental’, ‘x is a mental property’, and ‘‘x instantiates y’.
The formalization, then, is: (Ax) (Px & Fx & (Ay) (My & Ixy)). The predicate ‘F’ clearly applies not to y
but instead x.
216 J. E. Dorsey
123
For example,30 compare Wilson’s fuller definition of ‘‘the (basic31) physical’’
(Wilson 12, bold print mine):
The physics-based NFM account: An entity existing at a world w is physical if
and only if:
(i0) it is treated, approximately accurately, by current or future (in the limit of
inquiry, ideal) versions of fundamental physics at w, and
(ii) it is not fundamentally mental (that is, does not individually […] possess
[…] mentality32).
Though the phrase ‘fundamentally mental’ in condition (ii) may (misleadingly)
suggest fundamental mentality (1), the clarification (in bold) makes it clear that
sense two is at issue (in part if not exclusively).33
If these two senses of the term seem equivalent, notice that fundamental
mentality (2) leaves it quite open whether the mental property itself is fundamental.
Consider, for example, the logically consistent belief that a fundamental physical
entity instantiates a mental property (M), but only by virtue of instantiating physical
properties upon which M metaphysically supervenes. This view clearly avoids
ontologically fundamental mentality, while admitting fundamental mentality (2).
This of course assumes that a fundamental entity (an electron, say) can have non-
fundamental properties. This is certainly not without precedent. For example, few
would deny that electrons can have the properties (i) being within two miles of Lake
Tahoe, (ii) weighing 9 9 10-28 g or weighing 9.01 9 10-28 g, (iii) having a mass,
or (iv) having some realized physical property Pn. Yet these are all orthodox
examples of non-fundamental properties.
As for the pro-NFMers, Wilson, to my knowledge, takes no stance on the issue of
whether fundamental entities can have non-fundamental properties. Her physics-
based NFM account allows for it. Levine (2001, p. 12) formulates physicalism
(before imposing the NFM constraint) as: Only the fundamental properties of
physics are instantiated in a basic way [i.e., are realized by no other properties]; all
others, particularly mental properties, are instantiated by being realized by the
instantiation of other properties. This certainly leaves room for fundamental entities
possibly instantiating non-fundamental properties and his second formulation (post-
NFM constraint) does the same.
30 Also, see Levine 2001, p. 20.
31 All other physical things are to later be defined in terms of these basic physical things. It is a
widespread strategy to split the task of defining ‘‘the physical’’ into these two parts.
32 Or, without omissions: ‘‘that is, does not individually either possess or bestow mentality (Wilson
12).’’.
33 Wilson might be running the two senses together. In fact, throughout the paper, she seems to slip back
and forth between fundamental mentality (1) and fundamental mentality (2), indicating a failure to
properly distinguish the two. On the other hand, she may be assuming that mental properties would be
fundamental properties if they are (allowed to be) posited in fundamental physics, in which case
fundamental mentality (2) would be at issue. (Perhaps, then, we should exclude mentality from the posits
of physics (as opposed to excluding them from what properties physical entities can possibly instantiate).)
In any case, condition (ii) (as per the parenthetical clarification) rules out the instantiation of mental
properties by a physical entity regardless of whether they are fundamental properties.
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8.2 The argument from anti-dualism disambiguated
With this distinction in hand, one can (and needs to) disambiguate the anti-dualist
argument. One way of doing so is as follows:
(1a) Physicalism is an anti-dualist doctrine.
(2a) Anti-dualist doctrines are incompatible with fundamental mentality (1).
(3a) So, physicalism is incompatible with fundamental mentality (2), giving
physicalists (and their rivals) reason to impose the NFM constraint.
The premises are not controversial and the conclusion is the right one. But, the
argument equivocates on the two senses of ‘fundamental mentality’.
To correct for this, one only needs to add a third premise. (2a0) is a natural
candidate:
(2a0) Fundamental mentality (2) entails fundamental mentality (1).
This, however, is false. For, again, consider the logically consistent belief that a
fundamental physical entity instantiates a mental property (M), but only by virtue of
instantiating physical properties upon which M metaphysically supervenes.
Fundamental mentality (2) certainly does not logically entail fundamental mentality
(1).34
A final disambiguation of the argument completely omits reference to
fundamental mentality (1):
(1a) Physicalism is an anti-dualist doctrine.
(2b) Anti-dualist doctrines are incompatible with fundamental mentality (2).
(3a) So, physicalism is incompatible with fundamental mentality (2), giving
physicalists (and their rivals) reason to impose the NFM constraint.
But, why think (2b) is true? The likely explanation here is that one believes (2a0).
But that, again, is false. Whether the reason or not, some other argument altogether
is needed for (2b).
This second argument, no matter how it is interpreted, thus fails to establish the
incompatibility of physicalism and fundamental mentality (2). There is no
defensible reason, then, to think that ‘‘physicalists (and their rivals) have good
reason to impose the NFM […] constraint (Wilson 70)’’, at least not purely on the
basis of physicalism’s being an anti-dualist doctrine.
9 A physicalist view of so-called fundamental mentality: a positive
argument
9.1 The plan and preliminaries
Is it the case that, as a definitional or conceptual truth, physical simples cannot be
mental? I contend it is not. For, consider the following intuition pump:
34 For those not convinced, see Sect. 9.
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Suppose you are operating an atom smasher and you think you have
discovered a physical simple, i.e. a physical entity with no proper parts. You
discover it has certain properties, like (say) spin, mass, certain effects on
quarks, a definite spatial location when measured, and so forth. But, now,
imagine God pays you a visit, assuring you this thing is indeed a simple but
also that it has a mental property. Is one inclined to say ‘‘I guess that simple’s
not physical after all’’ or instead ‘‘I guess that physical simple has a mental
property’’? It has all the same properties as before, just one more than
previously thought.
I would wager those answering honestly here incline toward the latter answer.
Hence, we should be open to the conceptual coherence of fundamental mentality (2).
With this in mind, I now articulate a view that embraces fundamental mentality
(2). It therefore openly violates both configurationism and what I call ‘weak
configurationism’, i.e., the view that a less restrictive version of the Configuration
Principle holds35:
The revised configuration principle Only physical entities that are non-simples
(i.e., beings with proper parts) can be conscious.
I then argue this view is rightly considered a physicalist view. If this is so, my
main contention of the paper follows.
Note I am not endorsing or recommending the view. In fact, I expect the average
reader to find it—considered alone at least—quite repugnant. That is fine. I contend
it is a physicalist view, nothing more.
9.2 Articulating the ‘‘FM’’ view
Consider, then, a view that embraces fundamental mentality (2). It may be called,
for want of a better name, the ‘‘Fundamental Mentality (or FM)’’ view. For the time
being at least, sink the question of whether it meets the requirements of minimal
physicalism, which I turn to in the next section.
The first part of the FM view provides its central definitions and one sufficiency
condition. To begin with, the view’s definition of ‘physical object’ is:
D1: An object is a physical object if and only if the object has properties P1, …,
Pn.
‘P1, …, Pn’ is a placeholder for the ‘‘definitional’’ physical properties, i.e., those
properties the collective having of which is enough to count an object as physical
(whatever those may be).
For the sake of being more concrete, one possible way of filling in ‘P1,…, Pn’ is
to use the spatial location view (SLV).36 On this view, only one property, P1, is both
35 Less restrictive in that it allows (in principle) more to be conscious.
36 Ned Markosian, e.g., holds this view. See (Markosian 2000).
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necessary and sufficient for being a physical object, where P1 is the property of
being spatially located. Substituting into D1 we get:
SLV: An object is a physical object if and only if the object has the property of
being spatially located.
The FM view, however, is not wedded to this.
As to ‘physical property’, the view only provides a sufficiency condition (not
a definition!), one that rides piggyback on the definition (D1) of ‘‘physical
object’’:
S1: A property is a physical property if, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, it
can be instantiated only by physical objects (i.e., objects having P1, …, Pn).37
Finally, the view’s definition of ‘mental object’ is:
D2: An object is a mental object if and only if it has a mental property.
The notion of ‘mental property’ is taken to be a primitive, understood without
definition.
The second part of the FM view moves beyond definitions and sufficiency
conditions to its metaphysical claims. The view is intended to be a physicalist view,
therefore admitting no fundamental mentality in the problematic (first) sense, but
admitting fundamental mentality (2).
First, M1 and M2 provide its physicalist ambition:
M1: All objects in the actual world, including mental objects, are physical
objects.
and
M2: All mental properties that apply in the actual world are physical properties.38
Second, M3 takes a further stance on M2:
M3: Mental properties are not ‘‘definitional’’ physical properties, i.e., they play
no role whatsoever in P1, …, Pn and yet, as a matter of metaphysical necessity,
only physical objects can instantiate them.
This tells us why, on the FM view, mental properties are physical properties. It
also helps make the view (relatively) more palatable since few are inclined to use
37 For any property Q, the conjunctive property P1 &… & Pn & Q meets this sufficiency condition. This
conjunctive property, though, would only meet the condition because it requires that the conjunctive
property, P1 & … & Pn is instantiated and has nothing (necessarily) to do with Q.
If one is not willing to count such a property as a (in some cases very unusual, often non-paradigmatic)
physical property, then make the following restriction. For any conjunctive property of the form P1 &…
& Pn & Q, Q (alone) must also meet the sufficiency condition in order for P1 & … & Pn & Q to be
properly considered a physical property.
38 One may remove the ‘mental’ here to get a more general formulation of physicalism. As should be
clear, I am here primarily interested in physicalism about the mind/the mental.
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mental properties in defining ‘physical object’ (even were they agreed to meet the
sufficiency condition (S1) for being physical properties).39
Finally, M4 and M5 introduce ‘‘fundamental mentality’’:
M4: The actual world is not infinitely decomposable—it ‘‘bottoms out’’ in a layer
of simples.
and
M5: One mental property applies to at least one simple.
Call the view with (this weak version of)40 M5 the ‘‘minimalist’’ FM view,
though the ‘minimalist’ is dropped in what follows. This, then, is the FM view.
9.3 Does the FM view meet the requirements of minimal physicalism?
The FM view claims mental properties meet the sufficiency condition (S1) for being
a physical property. People will likely disagree with this crucial part of the view.
Clearly, there is plenty else to disagree with. But, whether one accepts the view or
any part of it is not the issue here.
The issue instead is whether the FM view is a physicalist view. This may be
broken down into three sub-issues, which correspond to Kim’s three criteria for
minimal physicalism. Specifically, is the FM view (i) anti-Cartesian, (ii) such that it
preserves mind–body dependence, and (iii) such that it preserves mind–body
supervenience?
9.3.1 Is the FM view anti-cartesian?
M3 makes the FM view anti-Cartesian. It says, in part, that, as a matter of
metaphysical necessity, only physical objects can instantiate mental properties. The
linchpin of Cartesian dualism is the view that something could (possibly) be a
thinking thing and yet not be an extended thing, which Descartes takes to show that
extended substances and thinking substances are truly distinct.41 Plug any
reasonable conception of the physical (say, the SLV) into D1 and the FM view is
then, broadly speaking, anti-Cartesian. Substitute (say) is extended into D1 and the
FM view then directly contradicts Descartes’s actual view. That is anti-Cartesian
enough.
39 Here, if anywhere, is where I think that physicalists should exclude mental properties (i.e., from the
definitional physical properties). But, this is not to rule out fundamental mentality (2). In other words, it is
one thing to say we should turn to (future/ideal/etc.) physics for the definitional physical properties and
exclude mental properties from physics but quite another thing to add Wilson’s condition (ii) (see p. 11) to
the definition of ‘‘the physical’’.
40 An alternative M5 on the other end of the spectrum is: One mental property applies to every object in
the actual world, including any simples or relatively simple objects. This would provide a panpsychistic
version of the FM view. Of course, there are a whole host of FM views between.
41 Cf. Meditation Six (Descartes1998), }9. There, Descartes relies on God to guarantee that what he can
clearly and distinctly perceive as separate is really separable.
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9.3.2 Does the FM view preserve mind–body dependence?
The FM view clearly preserves mind–body dependence. According to the view, an
object cannot even possibly (as a matter of metaphysical possibility) have a mental
property (thus counting it as a mental object) without its first being a physical
object. It therefore preserves a strong dependence of mental objects (minds) on
physical objects (bodies) (i.e., objects having P1, …, Pn).
9.3.3 Does the FM view preserve mind–body supervenience?
The FM view is purposefully constructed to avoid certain supervenience claims.
This is because Kim’s third criterion (and some people’s sole criterion) for minimal
physicalism may not be minimal enough (depending on how the claim is cashed
out). This, however, is not the right place to get into such matters, though it is
certainly worth flagging.
Thankfully, present purposes do not require this issue to be resolved. One only
needs to add a sixth metaphysical claim (M6) to the FM view, in which case it
surely preserves mind–body supervenience.
M6: All mental properties instantiated in the actual world metaphysically
supervene on (non-mental) physical properties.
Crucially, M6 contradicts no other part of the FM view. Rather, it simply
strengthens the FM view with respect to the relation said to hold between mental
properties and (non-mental) physical properties. In fact, M60 is consistent with the
FM view as well:
M60: All mental properties instantiated in the actual world are realized by (non-
mental) physical properties.
As normally conceived, X realizing Y entails the supervenience of Y on X.
Clearly, the FM view is easily made to preserve supervenience, all the while
embracing fundamental mentality (2). So, if minimal physicalism requires that this
third condition be met at all, the FM view can easily accommodate it.
9.3.4 Conclusion
The FM view, some way or another, meets all three of Kim’s criteria for minimal
physicalism. It is wholly unclear what else one could ask from a physicalist view. I
conclude that the FM view is a physicalist view despite the fact that it embraces
fundamental mentality (2). The only proviso is that one might need to add M6 (or
perhaps M60) to the view. This suggests that what really matters to maintaining
physicalism is avoiding fundamental mentality (1), while fundamental mentality (2)
is optional.
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10 An irresistible objection
10.1 The objection
Despite the disclaimers people likely will object along the following lines: Surely
you do not believe that simples (should they exist), or say protons and quarks, are
actually mental. No one believes that. People believe to the contrary that, just like
clouds, peach pits, and sidewalks, quarks and the like are thoroughly non-mental. To
believe that they are is pure madness.
10.2 A caveat
It is wrongheaded to think that if simples have mental properties, then they have
mental properties just like ours. In fact, they might have proto-mental properties,
i.e., properties that combine to form the mental properties we recognize at the
macro-level. Take the following (toy) example. A simple has the property (X) of
being disposed to create a complex entity that experiences pain when joined with
another simple that has X. Neither of two X-bearing simples are in pain, so neither
has a mental property that in any way resembles the ones with which we are
familiar. Nonetheless, they have mental properties, broadly construed, since they
have properties that combine to form qualia.
Perhaps allowing proto-mental properties to count as mental properties is to
construe the notion too broadly (perhaps not). Nonetheless, there may be mental
properties that are less like mental properties such as ours. Perhaps, for example, there
in fact is something it is like to be a bat, but maybe it is very different than what it is like
to be a human. Or, perhaps there is something it is like to be an octopus, or an insect, or
Lewis’s martians, or some gelatinous blob. Perhaps, even, mental states can exist that
are not a gestalt of various modalities (like ours) but that are instead extremely simple.
The theoretical possibilities are nearly limitless. Suffice it to say that if a simple has
mental properties, then they need not be mental properties just like ours.
10.3 Primary response
To repeat, whether quarks or the like are actually mental is not at all central to the
present issue. True, if one believed this and that such things are still physical, she
would agree with the claim I actually make. But, just to be clear, the claim I actually
make is that one may be (and is rightly consider to be) a physicalist while holding
such a view, not that I or that anyone necessarily should hold it.
10.4 A secondary response
I do not believe quarks or the like are actually conscious, or that they are mental in
any way. But nor, for the record, do I believe they are not. How anyone could know
either way is a mystery to me. The same goes, for that matter, regarding clouds,
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peach pits, sidewalks, and so on. Like Malebranche’s view of animals,42 the
objector seems to overreach her epistemic warrant, likely expressing more of a
prejudice than a critically held view.
One could argue, though, that we should resist postulating mental quarks on
the same basis that we resist postulating anything for which there is a lack of
evidence. For example, we resist postulating the existence of pixies living in
the walls because there is no evidence for it, preferring outright denial here to
safe agnosticism. In response, it ought to be said that that is correct for pixies.
We do not, however, prohibit the postulation of additional properties where
doing so may help us to explain extant phenomena. In the present case, we
have an outstanding problem (the mind–body problem and the surrounding
problems) with respect to which additional postulation might be helpful.
11 Conclusion
I conclude that the minimal thesis of physicalism is compatible with fundamental
mentality (2), as well as panpsychism. This suggests the following argument:
(1) Legitimate versions of physicalism, like the FM view, can embrace
‘‘fundamental mentality’’, i.e., fundamental mentality (2).
(2) If we impose the NFM constraint, this rules out such versions of physicalism.
(3) Hence, advocates of the FM view (and its rivals) have good reason not to
impose the NFM constraint on their operative account of the physical.
This result has clear implications toward current discussions of how to define the
physical: however it is defined exactly, the NFM constraint goes too far. It also
suggests, as noted in the introduction, that the physicalist’s playing deck is deeper
than normally supposed when encountering problems like the explanatory gap, the
‘‘hard problem’’ (Chalmers 1995), or whatever problem, including the classic mind–
body problem. Whether it really ultimately helps raises further issues. But, to be
perfectly frank, such a shift of focus is more than welcome given the apparent
stagnation of the debate.
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42 ‘‘[Animals] eat without pleasure, cry without pain, grow without knowing it; they desire nothing, fear
nothing, know nothing (Malebranche 394).’’
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